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ABSTRACT
Neuronal ceroid lipofuscinoses (NCL) are a group of lethal inherited 
neurodegenerative disorders in humans and many animal species. My 
research on sheep and cattle with NCL raises critical questions on a 
range of ethical issues, specifically the claim that sheep and cattle 
are useful models for the disease in humans and other related moral 
problems. My reflections on moral status of animals and validity of 
animal models are outlined in this paper.
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1. Introduction
As a veterinarian and animal geneticist, my key research in-
terest has been the development of diagnostic tests for inherited 
disorders in livestock.  More recently, I developed an interest 
in bioethics as my research on sheep and cattle with the lethal 
inherited neurodegenerative disorder neuronal ceroid lipofusci-
nosis (NCL), and the claim that these animals are useful models 
for NCL in humans, created a need to reflect on the validity of 
these animals as models for human disease. Furthermore, meet-
ing children suffering from NCL and their families and attend-
ing NCL conferences created awareness of many other ethical 
dilemmas in relation to rare inherited disorders, genetic testing 
and the difficult task to find a cure. 
This paper, which focuses on the use of animals as mod-
els for human disease, introduces NCL as a rich case study 
for bioethical considerations relevant to the use of animals as 
models for human disease. I argue that the utilitarian approach 
that underpins legislation relating to animal research is not re-
solving scientists’ need to assess if their work is permissible. I 
also suggest that a principalist approach might be more useful 
for dealing with the complexities of specific medical research 
questions, the moral status of animals and the validity of animal 
models, as this approach allows various stakeholders to engage 
in discussion and in decision-making processes.
2. Neuronal Ceroid Lipofuscinoses
Neuronal ceroid lipofuscinoses (NCL) are a group of reces-
sively inherited neurodegenerative disorders in humans and 
animals. NCL have been described as the most common in-
herited neurodegenerative disease in childhood, affecting an 
estimated 1 in 12,500 children worldwide (Rider and Rider 
1999). These disorders are characterised by common clinical 
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signs and pathology, such as progressive visual impairment 
leading to blindness, progressive mental and motor deteriora-
tion, seizures, brain and retinal atrophy and accumulation of 
fluorescent storage material in lysosome-derived organelles. 
NCL result in premature death as there is currently no cure for 
any form of the disease.  Different variants of the disease have 
been described—initially, based on differences in age of onset 
of disease, rate of progression and type and structure of storage 
material—and more recently based on the more than 10 genes 
identified as having disease-causing mutations (Mole 2011a). 
The identification of disease-causing genes has improved di-
agnostic approaches (Kousi et al. 2012) but the identification 
of these genes has not yet provided a breakthrough in the un-
derstanding of the disease mechanisms. Various experimental 
therapies (e.g., gene therapy, stem cell therapy and various 
pharmacological therapeutic approaches) are being evaluated 
in clinical trials on children affected with some variants of NCL 
(BDSRA 2011, Mole 2011b). 
Numerous ethical issues can be identified in relation to this 
group of diseases (e.g., dilemmas relating to research and clini-
cal trials involving vulnerable participants; use of new biotech-
nologies such as DNA testing, gene therapy, stem cell therapy 
and enzyme replacement therapy; and public health issues re-
lating to rare diseases such as delayed diagnosis and limited 
funding for care of affected children, support for families and 
research)—which will not be discussed in this paper.  
The disease has also been identified in many animal species 
including dogs, sheep, cattle, ferrets, cats, horses, goats and 
pigs (Palmer et al. 2011) and mice (Cooper et al. 2011). The 
forms of NCL found in domesticated production and compan-
ion animals and some mice are caused by naturally occurring 
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mutations. In all these cases, diagnosis and research into NCL 
in animals is of veterinary interest in its own right. The use of 
these animals as models for human disease has been claimed by 
many researchers to be crucial in the investigation of this group 
of diseases and has been proposed to be central for the devel-
opment of a better understanding of the disease mechanisms 
and the development and evaluation of possible therapeutic 
approaches. Some of these large animals have therefore been 
bred and used successfully as models for the human diseases 
(Palmer et al. 2011).  In addition, genetically modified mice as 
well as yeast, nematode worms, fruit flies and zebrafish have 
been generated to create models for the many variants of NCL.
My own research focuses on sheep and cattle that are affect-
ed with NCL (Houweling et al.2006; Tammen et al. 2006;Fru-
gier et al. 2008). Initially the research concentrated on the 
identification of disease-causing mutations in these animals for 
diagnostic purposes in livestock industries. Meeting human pa-
tients and their families at conferences, and exposure to fund-
ing opportunities from human medical research grants, created 
an interest in maintaining and using sheep as models for the 
corresponding human disease. As I am directly involved in this 
research, and thus biased, I will not aim to defend specific as-
pects of the NCL research in this paper. Instead, I will reflect 
on more general issues relating to the use of animals as models 
for human disease. 
3. Personal reflections on moral status of ani-
mals and validity of animal models 
As a veterinarian and animal geneticist I have a strong inter-
est in conducting ethical and scientifically valid research. The 
shift from conducting research on animals for the benefit of an-
imals to conducting research on animals as models for human 
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disease instigated reflections on the moral status of animals and 
the validity of animal models.  The use of animals as models 
for human physiology and pathology has a long and at times 
controversial history (e.g., Guerrini 1989; Paixão and Schramm 
1999; Baumans 2004) and is debated widely from divergent 
and constantly evolving standpoints. Key issues in this debate 
are disagreements among philosophers relating to the moral 
status of animals, as well as disagreement among philosophers 
and scientist in relation to the validity of animal models. 
4. Moral status of animals
There are three major positions in relation to the debate on 
the moral status of animals (Sandøe et al. 2008). There are the 
two extreme positions:  animals either don’t have a moral sta-
tus at all (and thus can be used for any research), or they are 
considered to have a moral status equivalent to the moral status 
of humans (and thus cannot be used as a mere “means to an 
end”). In between these extreme positions is a third position 
that comprises a continuum of viewpoints held by represen-
tatives of various philosophical frameworks (and apparently 
the majority of the population): that animals have some moral 
status although of a lesser degree than the moral status of hu-
mans—which allows the use of animals with varying levels of 
limitations.  This continuum of viewpoints reflects differences 
in philosophical standpoints, as well as differences in cultur-
al, socio-economic and religious backgrounds (Legood 2000; 
Gilbert et al. 2005). Even within a philosophical framework, 
views on the moral status of animals are often debated. Another 
important issue is that the perceived moral status of animals 
often depends on the species concerned. This perception can be 
based on scientific (e.g., phylogenetic relationship to humans, 
complexity of nervous system or level of sentience) or emo-
tional considerations, which are often associated with the role 
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that different animals are perceived to have in our society (e.g., 
companion animals versus livestock versus rodents). 
A moderate utilitarian viewpoint has been adopted to under-
pin animal welfare legislation and regulation in many coun-
tries. Moderate utilitarianism considers that animals have some 
moral status and accepts a balancing of the costs to one moral 
agent versus benefits to another moral agent. This should create 
some certainty for scientists on how to assess if their research 
is permissible—at least on legal grounds. It provides a basis for 
comparing the implicit need to minimise suffering in animals 
and to prove adequate benefits of research, these being key cri-
teria that allow for the development of workable compromises 
in animal research (Ryder 2006; Sandøe et al. 2008). Unfor-
tunately, what sounds like a simple requirement is in reality a 
difficult task, specifically as there remains uncertainty on how 
to accurately define and measure the suffering of animals, how 
to exactly weigh suffering between moral agents of different 
species (including humans), as well as how to assess how moral 
agents benefit from research conducted in other moral agents 
(of the same or different species). It thus remains often dif-
ficult (for animal researchers and animal ethics committees) to 
decide where to draw the line between what is ethically accept-
able and what is not. Even if the difficulties of the utilitarian 
calculus could be overcome, animal researchers are still faced 
with the need to defend their research against those disagreeing 
with the moderate utilitarian approach.   
A principalist approach (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) 
might be more useful to guide moral action in relation to the 
assessment of dilemmas concerning animals.  Due to the fail-
ure of most normative approaches in biomedical context, Beau-
champ and Childress (2001) suggested that a process of “shared 
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moral reflection”, with the aim of balancing the four principles 
of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and jus-
tice, can guide moral action in situations of difficult-to-resolve 
ethical dilemmas. In contrast to utilitarianism, some norms 
cannot be balanced, and disagreement is a tolerable component 
of this approach due to the acceptance of validity of pluralistic 
views. Disagreement about the moral status of animals and lack 
of exact measures for suffering of animals and benefits of re-
search are thus not limitations for this method.  Mepham (1996) 
has applied principlism in an animal context by developing the 
“Ethical Matrix”, which allows for the additional complexity 
when agents beyond just the single class of humans need to be 
considered.  This ethical matrix has been considered by others 
as a useful decision-making tool in relation to issues concern-
ing animals and humans, as it provides structure in participa-
tory interdisciplinary approaches without pre-empting content 
or evaluation or ignoring pluralism (e.g., Kaiser and Fosberg 
2001).
5. Validity of animals as models for human dis-
ease
In the discussion about validity of animal models in bio-
medical research it is important to first consider how models 
are used in scientific research and to consider any differences 
in how models might be used in different disciplines. Scientific 
research identifies “gaps” in current knowledge and aims to 
fill these gaps with generalisable knowledge using appropriate 
methods. 
The notions of truth and knowledge in science are contested, 
especially in relation to medical science. Traditionally, scientific 
validity was associated with the concept of research being “ra-
tional”, “objective” and “morally neutral”. More recently there 
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has been a shift (e.g., Fleck, Kuhn, Foucault and feminist phi-
losophers such as Lloyd, Wylie and Potter) towards acknowl-
edgement that research is “contextual” and “value-influenced” 
with an increasing awareness that ultimate truth does not exist 
in science.  Orthodox medicine has defined itself and differenti-
ated itself from non-orthodox medicines with the claim that it is 
based on unbiased scientific method (Sullivan 1993).  It has to 
be noted that medicine is different from many other scientific 
disciplines (such as mathematics or physics), largely due to the 
complexity of biological systems. Knowledge in medicine is 
unlikely to be absolute but in most instances probabilistic; bio-
medical theories often lack generalizations of broad scope and 
have been described as “structures of overlapping interlevel 
temporal models” (Schaffner 1986). 
Models are generally accepted as valuable tools in scientific 
experimentation and a large number of model-types have been 
defined and discussed in the scientific and philosophical litera-
ture. From a philosophical position, discussions about models 
explore questions relating to the representational function they 
perform (semantics), to what they are (ontology), and to how 
they assist in learning/knowledge-generation (epistemology), 
to how they relate to theory and to how their use sits in the 
contexts of debates over what science is  (Frigg and Hartmann 
2008).  
In semantics, models can be understood as representations 
of a selected part of the world which are used to picture phe-
nomena or data, or they can represent a theory and are used to 
test these theories (Frigg and Hartmann 2008).  Animal models 
can be understood as representational models of phenomena 
and are largely understood as analogical models (i.e., animals 
have certain relevant similarities to humans) but can also have 
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some aspects of idealized models (e.g., simplification of genet-
ic variation and environmental factors using inbred mice lines 
under laboratory conditions). However, in regards to analogical 
models there is debate as to what level of similarity is needed 
or which similarities are relevant. Interestingly, Mary Hesse 
distinguishes between positive, negative and neutral analogies 
(positive analogies are those features which are shared by both 
systems, negative analogies are those features which are pres-
ent in one system but absent in the other, and neutral analogies 
are those features whose status as positive or negative analo-
gies is uncertain at present) (Frigg and Hartmann 2008). This is 
of interest in the context of animal models for human disease as 
the neutral analogies (i.e., those properties of animals for which 
it is not known yet whether they are similar to humans or not), 
which are often used to criticise the validity of animal models, 
are considered by some researchers to be of great importance, 
as they are useful for the development of questions and hypoth-
eses (Frigg and Hartmann 2008).
The epistemologic discussion of how we generate knowl-
edge using models is of great importance. Hughes (1997) sug-
gests that learning with models happens in three stages—deno-
tation, demonstration and interpretation. We learn in the pro-
cess of choosing the “best” model as we explore differences in 
“representation relation” or analogy between different species/
breeds/age groups and humans (denotation). We then conduct 
experiments with the animal model and learn about the model 
(demonstration). Finally, we draw conclusions from the re-
search in relation to human disease (interpretation).  In relation 
to the discussion of validity of animal models for human dis-
ease, concerns are related to all three steps. 
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Firstly, it is not always clear which species is the best model 
for a specific biomedical question—and the most similar spe-
cies is not always the most practical model. Furthermore, the 
increase of similarity/analogy between different animal species 
and humans is for many associated with an increase in mor-
al status of animal species (e.g., Nordgren 2002; Wolfensohn 
and Lloyd 1995) and thus the most similar/best model might 
be least defendable on ethical grounds.  It can be argued that 
the use of multiple species as models for different aspects can 
increase validity of animal models for human disease, e.g., ge-
netically modified knock-out mice might be useful to gener-
ate some knowledge about which genes cause which inherited 
diseases but large animal models are increasingly considered 
to be more useful in the context of evaluation of therapeutic 
approaches for inherited diseases (Ellinwood and Clay 2009). 
Secondly, concerns have been raised with the quality of the 
research conducted on animal models, suggesting that research 
design and methodology in this research field are often flawed 
(Pound et al. 2004; Perel et al. 2006). However, many other 
studies defend the validity and relevance and thus implicitly the 
quality of research on animal models (e.g., Botting and Mor-
rison 1997; Morrison 2002). This debate is useful, as it is likely 
to improve the quality of research related to animal models and 
provides some arguments that a strong focus on reduction in 
animal numbers needs to be carefully balanced with consider-
ations for appropriate research design.
Thirdly, research on animal models has been critiqued be-
cause knowledge gained from animal models does not reliably 
translate to the human context. Awareness that an interpretation 
stage is an essential part in the process of learning from models 
clearly identifies that any assumption that knowledge from ani-
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mal models can always be directly applied to the human context 
is unrealistic. This interpretation needs to consider that animal 
models are representations of and not identical to humans and 
there needs to be awareness that negative and neutral analo-
gies exist between animal models and humans and that many 
animal models are simplifications or idealizations of disease in 
humans (e.g., the above-mentioned inbred mouse lines, which 
lack genetic variation and the use of experimental designs to 
minimise environmental variation). Furthermore, it needs to be 
remembered that disease in humans is often complex and prob-
abilistic in relation to its causes. As a consequence, converting 
knowledge about the animal model into knowledge about hu-
man disease should always occur with considerable caution. 
Not all animal models provide results that are directly and reli-
ably transferable to the human context and thus research on 
animal models alone is not sufficient proof to confirm research 
hypotheses relating to human disease. However, I argue that 
this is not expected if one understands semantics and episte-
mology of models and although the knowledge might not be 
directly transferable, knowledge is generated and new hypoth-
eses can be developed that will ultimately assist in the devel-
opment of better understanding of disease. Consequently the 
model still has validity from an epistemological view.       
Validation of animal research in the human context is neces-
sary and, consequently, carefully supervised clinical trials in 
humans must follow the results of research on animal models. 
From my position, research using animal models can be valid 
as long as the representational function of the model is clearly 
understood and care is taken when knowledge is translated to 
the human context.
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6. Conclusions
It has been observed that “...moral reality is less tidy and 
more complex than many theories portray” (Li 2002, 589). 
In relation to ethical questions, the co-existence of well-in-
formed divergent views, which are based on different philo-
sophical, cultural, social and/or religious frameworks, is the 
norm. It is only respectful, considerate and open-minded dis-
cussion of these divergent views that enables society to develop 
approaches to deal with the underlying ethical dilemmas. The 
continuum of views in relation to the moral status of animals 
is the main reason for an ongoing and intensive debate. Inher-
ent in the “middle way” view of the moral status of animals is 
the acceptance that in some situations animal use in research 
can be morally justified, e.g., if alternative approaches of equal 
effectiveness are unavailable, if humankind benefits from the 
research and if every attempt is made to reduce the suffering of 
animals. Much healthy debate is related to defining how much 
suffering is acceptable for what benefits, and these discussions 
have resulted in many improvements to regulation, legislation 
and transparency of animal use and consequently improved 
animal welfare. 
As our understanding of animals’ capabilities and limitations 
improves over time, it is important to recognize that what is 
considered as permissible today might not be permissible in 
the future. This requires researchers to continuously reflect on 
their practice. 
As a scientist who is involved in research on an animal mod-
el for human disease, I acknowledge that I am biased when 
defending the validity of animal models to generate knowledge 
that is useful in the context of human disease. It needs to be 
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stressed that not all animal experimentation is acceptable and 
not all of animal-model research is valid, that animal models 
are only one of many routes to gain knowledge in the medical 
context, and that there are matters of degree in validity, par-
tially relating to the species used, the medical question investi-
gated and/or the type of knowledge that is claimed to be gained 
(e.g., explanatory or predictive information). Furthermore, 
research relating to animal models needs to be conducted to 
high professional standards: it needs to fulfill ethical, legal and 
professional requirements. Also, care needs to be taken in what 
conclusions for human disease can be drawn from the results 
of animal experimentation. It needs to be clear that a model is a 
model and thus a simplification and/or analogue of the target of 
interest and that the target of interest—disease in humans—is 
often complex and probabilistic in relation to its causes. It is 
therefore the researcher’s responsibility to clearly outline the 
advantages and constraints of using animal models, and not to 
over-generalise or overstate the results obtained from such re-
search—especially in communications with non-scientists. 
Considering that animals can be understood as vulnerable 
research participants with difficult-to-define moral status, and 
that the moral benefits of research are also difficult to define, 
it follows that the calculus of the moderate utilitarian approach 
to the use of animals in research (the approach that underpins 
current animal research regulation), appears unattractive.  Prin-
ciplism presents itself as an interesting alternative. It is widely 
accepted as a practical approach for ethical decision-making in 
the medical context and is increasingly used in animal contexts 
using Ben Mepham’s  “Ethical Matrix”. A key strength from 
my point of view is the acknowledgment of existing uncer-
tainties, recognition of the need to interpret ethical principles 
in case-specific context, acceptance of validity of pluralistic 
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views and the emphasis on identification of ethical dilem-
mas for various stakeholders in the system. This encourages 
interdisciplinary participation (e.g., animal ethics committee 
members would not be restricted to the utilitarian framework 
and more researchers as well as humans benefiting from ani-
mal research might feel encouraged to actively engage in ethi-
cal debate and decision-making processes). It appears crucial 
to educate researchers involved in animal experimentation in 
regards of bioethics so that they can effectively participate in 
such “shared moral reflection”.
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